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Foreword 
This working paper, written by a distinguished political scientist of Columbia 
University, was presented a t  a IIASA conference in Sopron, Hungary, October 18-21, 
1988. It has been the subject of correspondence with us a t  IIASA since and has been ex- 
tensively revised. As it stands i t  represents as good thought as is now available on a vi- 
tally important subject: the politics of youth. The restlessness of youth has been long 
talked about but the present demographic conjuncture gives it special saliency. 
In most of the more developed countries (MDCs) the postwar baby boom led to  
large numbers of youth--large in relation t o  the older population of the time--during the 
late 1960s, and this demographic fact coincided with an explosion of protest around the 
world. In due course that  explosion was contained, and most of the youth in question set- 
tled into middle class jobs. Only in countries of exceptionally rigid labor markets is there 
a residue of youth unable t o  insert itself into stable employment. 
For the less developed countries (LDCs) the baby boom has been later, and was due 
more t o  the fall in death rates, especially infant mortality, than to  a rise in births. In fact 
birth rates did rise in some places; elsewhere they remained constant or fell, but not 
enough t o  offset the fall in deaths. Youth cohorts of the LDCs a t  the present time are 
even larger in relation t o  the numbers of their elders than they were in the MDCs in the 
late 1960s. 
Howard Wriggins writes from his knowledge of a number of Asian and African coun- 
tries, showing the political effect of large youth cohorts, in the context of multi-cultural 
societies, with newly raised standards of education, where economic progress is indeed oc- 
curring but not fast enough to  satisfy aspirations. I can corroborate some of what he says 
from my own knowledge of Indonesia, where youth was the spearhead of the 1965 events 
that  eventually terminated the Sukarno regime. 
Wriggins has helped me understand the  Indonesian youth cohort by putting it in a 
larger framework. Because I hope he can do the same for others concerned with problems 
of the LDCs, IIASA is putting out this working paper preliminary t o  what we hope will be 
a book on the subject. 
Nathan Keyfitz 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers possible connections between the rapid expansion in the youth 
cohorts and political outcomes. How do changes in the rate of growth and the size in rela- 
tion to  the balance of the population of the youth cohorts, most particularly those 
between 15 and 24, affect the political life of nations? Can one argue that whenever there 
are rapidly growing youth cohorts, there one can expect to  find political unrest a t  the 
least and possibly political upheaval? Could one use demographic data to  warn political 
leaders well ahead of time that serious political troubles probably lie ahead? 
To take one example, in the early 1970's, 15,000 Sri Lankan young people sought, 
through a one-night rising, to  seize leading political figures, capture police stations and 
take over the government of Sri Lanka. There were many factors a t  work, as careful 
analysis showed.[l.] It was a romantic, "Left-wing infantilen enterprise. Surely it was not 
mere coincidence, however, that some 25 years earlier Sri Lanka's youth cohorts had be- 
gun to  grow rapidly and that the overwhelming bulk of the activists arrested or killed had 
all been between the ages of 15 and 24. Similarly, could i t  be entirely coincidence that 
the surge in the growth of Tamil youth cohorts came somewhat later than among the 
Sinhalese, and dramatic Tamil youth militancy gained prominence 8 to  10 years later.[2] 
Apart from coups d'etat by older members of the military, such as Pinochet, it is 
characteristic of political instability that youthful militants are at the forefront of events. 
One is reminded of the role of young activists in the Cuban revolution in the mid-1950's. 
Prolonged rioting by anti-Marcos youths in the Philippines led him to impose martial law 
in 1972 and brought about the overthrow of his government in 1987. In Turkey in 1960, 
the end of the dramatic rule of Adnan Menderes began with huge numbers of student ri- 
oters who were eventually joined by thousands of others in the streets. In Iran in 1979, 
egged on by elderly religious zealots, it was the masses of angry youths who challenged 
the Shah's regime in ways his troops - and he himself - were unwilling to  repress. Since 
1980 in Sri Lanka, youthful secessionist Tamil militants known as "the boysn succeeded in 
halting a promising program of economic growth and bringing about a virtual civil war 
which led to  a massive Indian military intervention at the "requestn of the Colombo 
government. In India, young Sikhs turned weapons against the representatives of New 
Delhi, seeking secession in India's strategically important Punjab. In South Korea, stu- 
dent protests sparked such riots that in 1960, the old Syngman Rhee had to  step down 
sooner than he wished. More recently their successors challenged a strong and prosperous 
police state until in 1988 Korea's leaders reluctantly conceded elections. In Burma, stu- 
dent disorders brought Ne Win down although the army was able to retain power by 
harsh repression. In Algiers in 1988, an explosion of youthful anger challenged the role of 
the ruling party, the FLN, and brought about an increase in the powers of the National 
Assembly a t  the expense of the entrenched single party. In the People's Republic of Chi- 
na, a mass but non-violent youth uprising challenged the government of Deng Xiaoping in 
1989. In the United States, as the cohorts of the first baby boom came of age at  a time of 
acute political controversy over Vietnam, unprecedented riots and political eruption oc- 
curred in many American cities and shortly thereafter on American campuses. 
No doubt, there are other instances where sharply enlarged youth cohorts have 
affected political life, sometimes in dramatic ways. Their disruptive potential and the 
many ways political outcomes appear associated with these larger youth cohorts invite 
comparative analysis. To  explore these connections is no easy matter, however.[3] 
Firstly, these connections are "complex", not simple. Numerous intervening vari- 
ables connect demographics to  specific political events, and their roles as connectors 
change over time, often rather abruptly. Each is likely to have a dynamic of its own, and 
their interactions are hard to  capture.[4] 
Secondly, most of these intervening variables are difficult to state in quantitative 
terms, since much of importance in political life relates to  subjective matters such as 
people's identifications, perceptions, expectations and fears. Quantitative measures can 
accurately report head counts, but in themselves they may tell us little about the political 
significance of the quantitative measure. 
Thirdly, in many polities, particularly in a number of Less Developed Countries 
(LDC's) political institutions and conventions are not well-established and mutual accom- 
modation often proves impossible. Governments often try to  set limits to  disputes and to 
define what is, a t  least for the time being, the official, authoritative resolution of these 
differences. In such cases, much political life goes on beneath the surface, t o  break out 
suddenly in unforseeable ways. 
Finally, throughout we speak of "cohortsn as if each year's youth cohort was 
different from all the others and homogeneous within itself. Everywhere this is a serious 
exaggeration. Peasants will have different interests than graduates of high schools and 
universities. Particularly in parts of Africa and South Asia, cohorts are segmented by par- 
ticularistic affiliations, based on ethnic, linguistic or other identifications. Nevertheless, 
with this obvious caveat, we use the age cohort as the principal unit of demographic 
analysis. 
With these introductory comments, we first consider underlying demographic 
trends. 
11. UNDERLYING DEMOGRAPHICS 
There are three demographic phenomena that underlie these concerns. The first is the in-  
crease i n  sheer numbers in successive youth cohorts, and the larger and more abrupt the 
rate of their increase, the more disruptive they are likely to  be. A second dimension is the 
change i n  proportions of the population. It has been proposed that should these younger 
cohorts come to  represent some 20% or more of the total population, they often begin to  
assert themselves in the political arena more forcefully.[5] Thirdly, related to  these 
phenomena, the pace of urbanization is likely to  add to  their impact on political &airs, 
since politics is often driven by what happens in the cities. It is disproportionately males 
in this age group who flock to  the cities. For reasons to be explored below, they are the 
most readily available for political mobilization. 
In many LDC's since the end of World War I1 or following the eventual success of 
independence struggles, the total population has grown at  historically unprecedented 
rates. In the sixty years between 1950 and 2010, India and Indonesia are expected to  dou- 
ble, Egypt, the Philippines, and Turkey to triple, Pakistan and Mexico to  quadruple and 
Kenya to  increase eight-fold. 
More consequential, in most polities, the young population grew even more rapidly. 
Between 1960 and 1970, the total populations of Brazil and Colombia, grew at  a rate of 
2.9 and 2.16 per year respectively, enough to double every 25 years. However, the two sets 
of youth cohorts grew a t  a rate of 4.2 and 4.7 respectively, which would have led to  a dou- 
bling of the size of the youth cohorts in only 15 years! Similarly though less dramatically, 
in South Asia annual rates of overall population increase averaged 2.35 between 1970 and 
1975 but in Pakistan, for instance, the youth cohorts grew a t  a rate of 4.9 while the gen- 
eral population grew at "onlyn 2.57.[6] Put another way, the Philippines, Colombia and 
Venezuela doubled their youth cohorts in only 15 years between 1960 and 1975. Pakistan, 
Egypt, Malaysia and Kenya in 20 years, from 1960-1980; Algeria a bit later, from 1965 to 
1985. 
Each year, then, unprecedented numbers of young people have been knocking a t  the 
door of an adult world already hard pressed by the increase in sheer numbers; most poli- 
ties experiencing marked poverty and shortage of capital. These young people are seeking 
opportunity, hoping to  make real for themselves the aspirations they have embraced as 
they have been growing up. 
One way to  assess the challenges they are likely to pose to  political systems is to  
note how the rates a t  which these cohorts grow have changed over time and the direction 
of these changes. It would be useful to  note whether that growth had reached the max- 
imum or is still rising, and whether a decline was followed by a second-order increase as 
one generation of baby boomers produces it successors 15 to  20 years later.[7] While 
growth rates are slowing in a number of countries, particularly in Asia, that is not so true 
in much of black Africa and parts of Latin America. Appendix I1 reports the annual rate 
of growth of Youth Cohorts from 1950 through 2000, and shows how much they have 
varied over the years. The presumption here is that beyond a certain minimum, the 
higher the rate of growth, the more difficulties these cohorts pose to  the political sys- 
tem. [8] 
Another way to  consider the matter is to note the size of the 15-24 year cohorts in 
relation to  the total population. The larger the proportion in these politically critical 
years, i t  has been proposed, the more likely they are to  influence political events directly. 
Gary Fuller has plausibly argued to  use 20% as a hypothetical threshold. We found that 
in 1985 the ten polities in our sample showing the largest proportion in the youth cohorts 
in relation to  the rest of the population, in order of magnitude, were Vietnam, China, 
Thailand, Colombia, South Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan. Each of 
these, in different ways, has experienced political destabilization driven to  an important 
degree by youthful militants. 
An argument can be made that after all it is the over 25's who manage the state and 
the larger the numbers in the youth cohorts in relation to these adults, the greater the 
challenge they are likely to pose to any government. Indeed, one can find sharper 
differentiations between states if one orders them according to  the size of the youth 
cohorts in relation to  those who are 25 and over. Using 1985 data, this mode of measure- 
ment suggests the following states may face political difficulties in the near term: Algeria, 
Vietnam, Mexico, Nigeria and Iraq. 
Comparing these ratios over the five year period 1980 to  1985 showed that China's, 
Nigeria's, Burma's and Algeria's ratios all increased in the five year period. Could it be 
merely coincidence that China's showed the largest increase, of some 8%, and it was 
Chinese youth more than any other, who by their activities, shortly thereafter, challenged 
their government in ways the leaders could not accept? In Burma (3.7% increase) and Al- 
giers (2.92%), two other high scorers, youth cohorts also have erupted in the past few 
years (see Appendix IV for details). 
In these and other similar polities it is the size and rate of growth of the youth 
cohorts which appear to  pose a serious challenge to  incumbent governments. 
A third demographic perspective focuses on the pace and extent of urbanization.[9] 
Rapidly growing cities pose grave problems of water and food supply, and sewage dispe 
sal. It usually means a population that is disproportionately young and male, since it is 
the young men who leave rural homes first, without family or responsibilities. They may 
have little choice in the matter, since growing rural populations mean less land for each. 
Instead of the nurturing and restrictive family which has shaped their lives in rural areas, 
the city provides wonders and excitement, and a release from familial constraints. With 
luck it may also provide opportunity. But given the numbers pouring into many Third 
World cities, there may be long desperate periods before a job is found or a tolerable 
private life begun. Many large cities have been growing very fast. For example, Bombay 
and Manila doubled between 1960 and 1980, Karachi between 1960 and 1975 and will 
more than double again by 2,000. Seoul grew nearly 2 and 1/2 times between 1966 and 
1983 while Bangkok quadrupled between 1965 and 1985.[10] Lagos will double again by 
2000 as will Mexico City, moving from 17 million in 1985 to an expected 30 million by the 
end of the century. 
An increase in sheer numbers adds obvious loads to any polity. More people must be fed, 
clothed and housed. When arable land is scarce, competition for possession of or the right 
to  work it will intensify. Life giving water may fall short when the rains fail. If forests are 
the principal source of fuel, deforestation raises the cost of fuel to city dwellers and 
lengthens the time every rural family must devote to collecting fire wood. Even more 
serious, it brings rapid erosion and typically speeds flooding and a silting up of irrigation 
and hydroelectric systems and may alter climates permanently. 
To be sure, when youth cohorts rapidly expand, they may bring gains to  a polity. 
They add strength to  its military or productive manpower pool. Their creative energies 
may encourage innovation; their impatience with old ways may induce and accelerate 
needed change. 
On the other hand, when successive youth cohorts are larger than their predecessors, 
such demographics first increase pressures within the political system. As numbers in 
specific cohorts grow and age group proportions change, priority for governmental expen- 
ditures usually must also change. This is particularly disturbing when the numbers in- 
crease rapidly, since established ways of dealing with their needs are no longer sufficient. 
At the outset, the years of dependency call for specialized attention to  the care of 
the young, then to  their education and training in order to  prepare them for shaping their 
lives and for constructive participation in adult society. During these dependency years 
their needs may absorb financial and administrative resources that might otherwise be 
used for alternative purposes. School budgets may need to  be doubled and even trebled if 
polities are to  increase the proportion of school-aged children who attend, to  extend the 
years they study and improve the skills they learn. Low budgets may mean large classes, 
student passivity, learning by rote and early drop outs. 
The politically most important time is just beyond the years of dependency, when 
the young begin to conceive of themselves as ready to  enter the work force and typically 
are impatient to take up their own lives as adults. That is why the 15 to  24 year olds 
form the most critical cohorts for our purposes. This group can become far more political- 
ly consequential should its members believe they have interests that conflict with the con- 
cerns of those who have preceded them. Reflecting the perhaps special aspirations and 
resentments they acquire during these years of transition from youth to  adulthood, they 
may demand changes in the institutional structures their predecessors have created. In 
democratic systems, when the voting age is dropped from 21 to  18, as has occurred recent- 
ly in India, their increased numbers may give them more political power than the young 
ever had before. Unattached, they are the more susceptible to political, ethnic or religious 
appeals that give them a sense of solidarity with some and feelings of hostility toward still 
others. Capital cities like Djakarta, New Delhi, Kinshasa, Manila or Algiers, are the mag- 
nets that draw the unattached and ambitious young. 
If the population of any polity is homogenous, speaking the same language, drawn 
from similar ethnic backgrounds, following similar religious practices and life styles, the 
pressures from population growth and concentration may not prove to be so explosive. 
However, most states of Asia and Africa are "mosaic," multi-ethnic societies.[ll] As a 
result, the cities are filled with people coming from different tribes or castes; they may 
speak different languages and follow different religious and eating practices. Crowded 
pell-mell into city slums, they compete for jobs, for scarce living space, for necessities such 
as water and food. Such a "mosaic" society, divided by a complex cleavage structure, is 
prone to  bitter antagonisms, ethnic eruptions and periodic riots, as could be seen in 
Djakarta in the 1960's, in Kuala Lampur in 1969, in New Delhi and Bombay periodically, 
in Colombo in 1983 and Karachi in the late 1980's. It is little wonder that the city is the 
center of political disorder. 
In many societies there can be a visible difference between generations, a generation 
gap so to speak, deriving from different life experiences or sharply different conditions 
that have faced one generation compared to  the next. In a number of the Less Developed 
Countries, there are two notable and pernicious forms of this generation gap. A special 
"opportunity structure" has had harmful side effects over the longer run.[l2] In many of 
the states that gained independence shortly after World War 11, there was a sudden bur- 
geoning of opportunity for those with high school and college education to  move into 
highly responsible governmental positions, replacing the colonial officials who for the most 
part went back to  the metropoles. Those who graduated from colleges and university soon 
thereafter easily entered into lesser bureaucratic positions that also carried high status, 
career security and numerous opportunities to  supplement public service pay with various 
forms of "speed money." Unless the economies were rapidly expanding and public service 
positions are growing commensurately, a t  some point within the next two decades govern- 
mental positions became fully staffed and such opportunities became more scarce just as 
the successive maturing cohorts became more heavily populated. For the thousands who 
came later, it would be a long wait before these early recruits would retire and make room 
for those who arrived later on the scene. In the United States, the post war baby boomers 
have been similarly disadvantaged by comparison with their parents. 
Secondly, the life experiences of the "independence" generation and those who have 
come later have been very different. The first had heroic deeds to  perform, a sense of great 
achievement with independence; subsequently many became complacent with the post- 
independence arrangements they had done so much to shape; after all, these institutions 
were their creations. By contrast, succeeding generations who experienced the hard reali- 
ties of the post-independence "awakening" often felt frustration or even anger a t  the com- 
placent older generation. 
These and other demographic phenomena are linked to  political outcomes through a 
number of intervening variables. 
IV. INTERVENING VARIABLES 
A) THE LOADS/CAPABILITIES EQUATION: 
PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY AND JOBS 
FOR YOUNG ADULTS 
These additional loads that a system must be able to bear are weighed against a 
government's or political system's capabilities for carrying these loads. Ideally, the sys- 
tem should be able to supply these additional goods and services that are required during 
the years of dependency. It should also provide the openings and opportunities that alone 
can ease the transition to  productive adulthood as the young reach an age when they be- 
gin to contribute to  a government's capability. The performance of the economy is of fun- 
damental importance - how it affects the standard of living, the hopes of people and their 
ability to shape the kind of life they aspire to. 
JOBS FOR YOUNG ADULTS 
Perhaps the most important single "capability" required as the larger cohorts proceed up 
the population pyramid, is the ability to  provide jobs for those now ready to  enter adult- 
hood. In previous generations, when youth cohorts grew only slowly, it was not so difficult 
to  absorb the young in useful and satisfying occupations. They often continued to do what 
their fathers had done. But when over a period, successive cohorts are each larger than 
their predecessors, it becomes increasingly difficult to provide worthwhile employment to  
a significant proportion of the now much more numerous and often better educated young 
if the economy is not growing proportionately and becoming more diversified. 
One could consider the problems posed to  governments by assessing the average 
number of young people who become potential entrants into the labor market in specific 
countries for any chosen period.[l3] Between 1960 and 1990, for example, Lraq's and 
Zaire's new entrants will have doubled; Kenya's, Algeria's, Nigeria's, Bangladesh's and 
Indonesia's nearly trebled, China's quadrupled and Morocco's quintupled. India's grew by 
"onlyn 24% in thirty years while Malaysia's expanded only 10%. It is doubtful that there 
would be direct correlations with identifiable political episodes, but such data might pro- 
vide indicators of a t  least one among a number of significant variables. 
While data on unemployment are notoriously unreliable and non-comparable, job- 
lessness and severe underemployment is one of the indicators of probable trouble ahead. 
Before the overthrow of Marcos, it was estimated that some 16% of the work force was 
unemployed and over 40% were severely underemployed. Prior to the 1971 youth rebellion 
in Sri Lanka, nearly 40% of the 15 to  25 year-olds were reportedly without work.[l4] 
Political stability can be upset by large numbers of un- or underemployed youths if 
they remain unabsorbed into the political-economy. Put simply, young people without 
employment are easily led to  be politically disruptive. Understandably, they resent having 
to postpone forming a new family; they can be bitter as they see others ahead of them are 
already established. They can see the contrast between the rich and poor in societies 
where wealth is often flouted. They lack the life shaping discipline that regular employ- 
ment - rural or urban - provides. They have little to lose; they are prone to take risks. 
Youth enjoys the thought of quick transformations; by a bold stroke, the world can be 
made much better. Having had little experience of the complexity of these affairs, they 
are often overconfident that they have all the answers. All the more reason then, that 
unemployed youth should have a propensity to political disruption.[l5] 
Moreover, where life's chances are perceived as unrewarding and not likely to  im- 
prove, competition between groups of the young is likely to intensify. Individual competi- 
tion in the upper schools and universities may become more severe. More individuals con- 
tend for what may be a limited number of places on the land, for urban jobs, for housing. 
Youths who earlier were tolerant and mutually accepting can become antagonistic prota- 
gonists, contending against each other to better their own life's chances. Under such cir- 
cumstances, families, neighbors, clans, tribes, castes and ethnic communities may become 
more aware of their distinctness from one another and increasingly see each other as 
rivals.[l6] There is little doubt that Sri Lanka's ethnic strife was intensified by a growing 
perception among Sinhalese that what they saw as unfair Tamil prosperity had been 
achieved at  the cost of the Sinahelse and in turn, Tamil's saw their difficulties as the 
result of Sinhalese government policy. Religious differences may sharpen competitive 
rivalries, lending an aura of righteousness to  what may be otherwise understandable 
mainly as the very worldly search for jobs. 
When such social identifications become associated with demographic numbers, par- 
ticularly when differing family practices mean that some communities produce visibly 
more children than others, deep primordial fears become more salient. Individuals who be- 
fore were seen simply as individuals, perhaps even friends, often become transformed into 
representatives of the "othern ethnic community, tribe or faith. As suspicion and mutual 
hostility displace friendship, disorders are likely to  increase and more police may be need- 
ed to  maintain civic order. A "loadn of sustaining public order may be added to the debit 
side of the load/capability equation.[l7] 
People with employment, who can meet their own needs, may also be challenged by 
the work that also serves their own interests; they may be tired after their daily labors; 
they are less likely to  risk their small stake in life's chances by engaging in significant pol- 
itical protest; they are more likely to avoid violence. Those who find their way into con- 
structive participation, by their very youth can contribute their energy, their flexibility 
and a readiness to  innovate that their less flexible elders may have long since lost. 
These perspectives have been neatly synthesized by Nazli Choucri in the following 
proposition: 
"The higher the proportion of youthful population and the greater the unem- 
ployment, the greater the possibilities of dissatisfaction, instabilities and 
violence." [l8] 
It is therefore understandable that there is an association between political stability 
and economic growth. Up to a point they are mutually reenforcing. On the other hand, a 
marked rise in incomes per capita over a period of sustained prosperity, as in South 
Korea, may provoke impatience with authoritarian regimes whose political constraints are 
no longer seen as necessary,. 
B) A SUBJECTIVE VARIABLE: 
THE EXPECTATION - REALITY CONTRAST 
The real magnitude of the loads imposed upon the community and government by the ex- 
panded youth cohorts, depends also upon highly subjective variables. 
The intensity of youth demands is defined in part by expectations among the young, 
subjective realities that evoke for the energetic, restless young people images of what they 
can legitimately anticipate, a t  whatever age they leave educational and family institu- 
tions to  enter the adult world. Cohorts with expectations that go far beyond what the 
real world can offer impose an added burden; they often pose a severe challenge. 
If individuals expect little from their circumstances, then an increase in the size of 
the youth cohorts will not make much difference beyond the practical pressures and 
strains already noted. But should the increased numbers have among them individuals 
whose expectations about the future are for something considerably better than the reali- 
ty that seems to  be within their reach, added numbers of such young people can be a 
source of political restlessness and perhaps disruption. 
Expectations are shaped by many aspects of their lives. The experience of those close 
to  them, their family's place and traditions, these help shape the values and aspirations 
they make their own along the way. The educational system is of profound importance in 
affecting expectations. As Keyfitz pointed out in the case of Indonesia many years ago, in 
many LDC's the school and university system has expanded very rapidly. Where the p r e  
portion of the young who go to  school has been rapidly increasing, what is taught in class 
and what is otherwise learned in the school environment make a profound difference to  
what students come to  expect when they leave schools and universities. Out of all this 
they fashion an image of what it is reasonable to  expect. In addition, what political 
leaders - or counter-elites - publicly promise or allege, what the media stress or down- 
play, what young people hear or see about lives in other parts of the world, all these can 
affect expectations. 
To the extent that their "real" world comes close to  their expectations, it is likely, 
other things being equal, that these successive cohorts will move forward without politi- 
cally disruptive resentments. But should there be a marked gap between expectations and 
reality, between goals and plausible achievement, one can expect unrest, resentment and 
possibly politically disruptive behavior. Indeed, in urban disturbances, it is often the edu- 
cated unemployed who form the core of the activists.[l9] 
C) CHARACTER OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The character of the political system, its structures for representation, political control 
and mobilization, its ideology, its accommodative processes - all these influence the way 
particular age cohorts affect the polity. 
A representative system that opens participation through the vote may draw many 
of the most ambitious youth into the political mainstream. They may use their numbers 
and energies to promote their special interests. More likely, however, they will be drawn 
to follow older leaders who will use them for their own purposes. Such systems may a p  
pear disorderly and unstable as interest contends against interest in efforts to  have its 
special needs answered. But the system's openness may warn early of deep dissatisfaction 
and possible troubles ahead, permitting timely adjustment of policy or access to  sufficient 
influence to assuage rebellion. 
By contrast, a repressive state can contain popular hostility and appear to  be stable 
for a long time. Particularly where most roads to  opportunity can be traveled only 
through one's relation t o  officialdom and opposition can only be voiced a t  serious person- 
al risk, resentments will be silently nursed, awaiting the opportunity. Pent up resentment 
can turn the young into implacable antagonists and tempt the bitter to  revolution. It is 
often remarkable how long resentments can be repressed. But when they do explode, they 
can disrupt and even overturn regimes. 
In almost all political systems, there will be individuals and factions who see in the 
younger cohorts important political assets in the pulling and hauling of domestic political 
rivalry. Secessionist movements can also draw on the large numbers, often un- or under 
employed, who provide enthusiastic, zealous lieutenants and foot soldiers, so t o  speak, for 
political leaders seeking secession or threatening secession as a bargaining ploy. Examples 
can be seen in Eritrea, in Tamil speaking areas of Sri Lanka, in the Indian Punjab, 
Pakistan's Baluchistan, or Iraq's Kurdish areas. Before a movement turns violent, the 
unabsorbed youths can be activists mobilizing opinions in favor of stronger opposition t o  
central governmental rule. Should the movement go further to  symbolic riots or beyond 
that t o  guerilla resistance, large numbers of young zealots enhance the military power of 
the secessionist movement. 
Through these and other mobilizational activities, youth cohorts may gain a sense of 
their own numbers and their distinctness from those who have come before. Once they be- 
come aware of themselves as a numerically significant element in the polity they are likely 
to  see themselves as rightfully deserving more influence. 
Political ideologies may glorify the nation's tradition, enlisting the young to  identify 
with the nation's leaders, possibly helping to overcome the divisiveness of narrow commu- 
nal or ethnic identifications. More often, solidarities are more particular, fragmenting the 
polity, alienating one group from another and tempting to  secession. Plausible-sounding 
visions of a better future may induce rejection of the "establishmentn and invite an over- 
turning through revolution of what has existed but could not accommodate to  necessary 
change. They may also set standards of perfection that no real government could possibly 
realize. 
Accommodative processes may facilitate discussion, the exploration of alternatives, 
the civil discourse that induces disagreeing parties to emphasize the interests they share, 
and uncover together ways to  meet their different though not necesarily mutually ex- 
clusive needs. If spokesmen for the young have the right to  participate in this process and 
they are persuaded those who rule face up to the responsibility of accountability, youth 
cohorts are more likely to  work within given institutions than to  try to overturn them. 
Regular modes for generational change are helpful. Traditional western democracies 
allow a recognized political "oppositionn to organize. Elections are the occasions that im- 
pose accountability on those who rule and when dissatisfactions are most systematically 
articulated and often intensified. In the absence of competitive elections, changes in 
leadership generations are often very difficult; they will have to  be managed within official 
structures, where incumbents, all-too humanly cling to  office, as during the Brezhnev era. 
Without such changes, the restless young may despair of improving their life chances 
within established systems. Coups d'etat by younger officers are the more typical route 
for accelerated generational changes where civilian structures are not well established or 
cannot accommodate to  changing political pressures from below. 
D) LEADERSHIP AND POLICY 
The three intervening variables we have identified - the employment/unemployment ra- 
tio, the expectation/reality gap and the character of the political system - are themselves 
affected by both leadership and policy. 
An inspiring leader, such as the early Sukarno or Nkrumah, up to  a point can ma- 
terially alter the capability of a political system to respond to  the demands and 
grievances of youth cohorts. Even where there are many jobless and expectations have 
been profoundly contradicted by a harsh reality, resentment can be assuaged by a Frank- 
lin Roosevelt who can induce hope in the despairing and energize a lethargic bureaucracy 
into innovative ways of tackling unprecedented problems. A Tito inspired a diverse popu- 
lation and drew multi-ethnic youth cohorts forward in collaborative activities. 
To touch the springs of loyalty in the disaffected young requires special skills, and 
these will change with time. What evokes a response in one generation of youth cohorts 
leaves subsequent cohorts unmoved, or positively repelled. Leaders who stay in place too 
long usually discover that formulae that worked at  the beginning of their rule fall flat and 
set up a distance between themselves and the new young people who take the place of 
those who cheered the leaders when they first came to  power, as Deng Xiaoping 
discovered. 
Where competition is intensified by growing numbers cramped by a stagnant econe 
my, with its contracting opportunity for each individual, there may be individuals who 
find it  politically expedient to  exaggerate the contrast between one group's advantages 
and another's. Such invidious comparisons intensify group rivalries and mutual bitterness. 
When attacks on specific groups or more general riots are being organized, or when they 
erupt virtually spontaneously in say New Delhi, Colombo, Karachi, Rangoon or else- 
where, these young men are quick to participate with zeal, greatly complicating the 
uload" on governments to maintain public order and to  protect minorities. 
The policies a government chooses - or may be 'forced' - to follow can also make a 
difference. These are the least predictable. Understandably, policies toward expanding 
educational opportunities, toward university entrance, toward examinations, graduation 
and job assignment afterwards are particularly sensitive. 
Youth cohorts, however, do not care only about their own particular interests. No- 
tions of appropriate political behavior can also become issues of importance. Persisting 
authoritarian practices that once were acceptable, but may have lost their public legi- 
timacy can intensify resentment as in South Korea, Algeria, Poland or the People's 
Republic of China. Government policies appearing to contradict cherished traditional pol- 
itical practices can trigger the ire of youth cohorts. For example, policies that encourage 
the migration of one ethnic group into lands that another considers its traditional territo- 
ry can turn whole communities against a government, as in Sri Lanka. The egregious 
misuse of police power beyond what is thought in that society to be legitimate or the as- 
sassination of a popular opposition leader can be the trigger for political upheaval, as in 
the Philippines. 
It is not necessary for the young themselves to be the ones who invariably define the 
issue and set the strategy, nor is it only the unassimilated youth cohorts who make up the 
protesters, as we have seen in Poland, where organized shipyard workers have been in the 
forefront of truly consequential unrest. But where numbers willing to run severe risk are 
needed, typically it is the cohorts of unassimilated young who are the foot soldiers who 
mount the challenge that governments find difficult to  overcome. 
Leadership and policy thus can affect the other variables, contributing to  either con- 
tinuing stability or increasing the chances of eruption. 
These are among the important intervening variables that stand between the funda- 
mental demographics and probable political results. No wonder the political side effects of 
larger youth cohorts are difficult to predict with precision. 
V. DEMOGRAPHICS PROVIDE THE BASIC PRE-CONDITIONS 
All this being said, it should be clear nevertheless that the underlying demographics pro- 
vide important - and sometimes critical - conditions leaders must contend with. The in- 
tervening variables discussed above contribute to the magnitude and intensity of the 
problems leaders will face. They also provide some of the tools they will have a t  their 
disposal or might be able to shape to their purposes. Demographic factors in turn intensi- 
fy the difficulties imposed on polities by inadequate performance of the institutions and 
processes that are here considered intervening variables. 
In sum, demographics in themselves are not likely to provide sufficient explanations 
for social eruption and violence. But they do generate fundamental aspects of these prob- 
lems. They can be of more significance than is usually attributed to them since 
yesterday's or today's demographics define parameters for tomorrow's administrative or 
political agenda. Demographics can raise warning flags well ahead! 
VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
There are three ways to  carry the analysis further. 
One can organize a series of case studies of political instabilities, such as the 
overthrow of President Marcos in the Philippines, the effort to  unseat Ne Win in Burma, 
the tragic ethnic riots in Malaysia in 1969, the secessionist movements in Sri Lanka or 
Ethiopia in the 1980's. Many others await analysis. Each can be examined in order to as- 
sess the role that population pressures played as a causal factor in these episodes. 
A second approach would be to test specific threshold propositions, such as Fuller's 
earlier proposition that when youth cohorts represent over 20% of the overall population 
political instabilities are very likely. 
One could test such a hypothesis by looking back to see whether past periods of un- 
rest are correlated with the years of maximum proportions. One can also identify polities 
facing possible trouble ahead by noting which are facing 20% or over in these politically 
critical age groups in the next decade. Iraq, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda are among those 
where the 20% threshold is likely to be piused in the 1990's. One could suggest similar 
probabilities when these cohorts are growing at  a rate of 3.8% to over 4% per year over a 
number of successive years. 
A third, and more ambitious approach would be to  shape a multi-variate study, such 
as is here roughly sketched, and develop a sophisticated cross-country comparison matrix, 
focusing attention on the role of the youth cohorts in different demographic conditions 
and political circumstances. A useful, pioneering model, is Population Pressures: Threat 
to  Democracy, by the Population Crisis Committee. It identifies five demographic charac- 
teristics and five problems of governance and assesses their interactions by careful 
quantification and correlations. 
Our analysis, therefore, represents an early sketch of significant dimensions and use- 
ful ways of thinking about the interconnections between rapid growth of the youth 
cohorts and the political problems of governance in many Third World nations. The pa- 
pers in a forthcoming volume explore more specific, illustrative examples. We hope these 
will lead others to undertake further explorations of these important matters. 
VII. TO SUMMARIZE THE ARGUMENT 
We have identified the abruptness and magnitude of the changes in the cohort size as a 
primary condition, imposing new "loadsn on the politico-economic system. This condition 
can be assessed by comparing the rate of population growth of the entire population and 
of the youth cohorts, the proportion in the youth cohorts as compared to  the rest of the 
population or to those over twenty five and how these rates change over time. The geo- 
graphical concentration of these cohorts also makes a difference, and urbanization is one 
way of recording that. 
The following intervening variables link these conditions to  political outcomes: 
(1) the "loads/capabilitiesn equation, is affected by (a) the size and abruptness of the 
new loads and (b) the economic performance of the polity, particularly its ability to 
generate productive and satisfying jobs for young adults. 
(2) The employment/unemployment ratio is one of the most important intervening vari- 
ables, yet it is not easy to  assess since reliable and comparable data are not readily 
available. Where large percentages find few opportunities, competition becomes more 
severe, intensifying class, ethnic, tribal and possibly religious rivalries. 
(3) Among the more "subjectiven variables, expectations are important. They are in- 
duced in any cohort by family and community life, the educational system, by esta- 
blished political practises, by experience and by public discourse. How these expecta- 
tions compare to  the opportunities that are in fact available does much to  shape the 
"satisfaction/resentmentn equation. 
(4) The character of the political system, its structures and modes of political mobiliza- 
tion, its ideology and its accommodative processes all affect the way particular age 
cohorts affect the polity. 
( 5 )  Finally, the qualities of leadership and the policies governments pursue also affect 
the way youth cohorts contribute to stability or to  political upheaval. 
It hardly needs saying that each of these variables has a quasi-independent dynamic 
of its own and that there will be much 'randomness" in the responses of large numbers of 
human beings to the circumstances they face. 
Yet there is also little argument that the underlying demographics provide helpful or 
baleful conditions with which statesmen and ordinary people must cope. 
The paper suggests three ways of pursuing these matters - a series of case studies of 
significant political episodes in which youth cohorts played a particularly consequential 
role, further 'threshold" studies analogous to Gary Fuller's explorations and a complex 
multivariate matrix analysis, along the lines of the Population Crisis Committee's model 
study of 1989. 
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APPENDIX I 
The states in our sample were: 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lan- 
ka, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela and Vietnam. 
APPENDIX II 
Annual Rate of Youth Cohort Growth 
(averaged per year within each recorded period) 
Algeria 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Burma 
China 
Colombia 
E ~ Y  pt  
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Kenya 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Marocco 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Phillipines 
S.Korea 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Calculated from: United Nations, World Population Prospects as assessed in 1984 (N.Y., 
United Nations, 1986). 
APPENDM m 
Polities with Youth Cohorts over 20% of the total population in 1985: 
Vietnam 
China 
Thailand 
Colombia 
South Korea 
Morocco 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
Turkey 
Pakistan 
Venezuela 
Iran 
Algeria 
Philippines 
Brazil 
Indonesia 
Burma 
Source: Calculated from World Population Prospects (op.cit.) 
Youth Cohorts in Relation to Adult Population, 
25 years and older. 
Country 1980 1985 1 to 2 Country 1980 1985 1 to 2 
(1) (2) 
% % % % % % 
(3 .1  (2) 
Algeria 
Vietnam 
Mexico 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh 
Morocco 
Colombia 
Iran 
Uganda 
Iraq 
Nigeria 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Venezuela 
Malaysia 
Brazil 
Ethiopia 
E ~ Y  pt 
Turkey 
Indonesia 
Burma 
SriLanka 
India 
China 
Data provided by Nathan Keyfitz, from World Population Prospects (op.cit.) 
